

For more information, see <www.thememoryhole.org/phoenix/>

CONFIDENTIAL



MACCORDS

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador R. W. Komer  
Deputy for CORDS to COMUSMACV

SUBJECT: Action Program for Attack on VC Infrastructure,  
1967-1968

I. PURPOSE

(a) To coordinate and give new impetus to US and GVN operations, both intelligence collection and processing and action operations, directed toward elimination of VC infrastructure.

(b) To ensure that basic programs conducted by different GVN/US organizations and components, as they relate to identification, exploitation and elimination of the VC infrastructure, are mutually compatible, continuous, and fully effective.

II. DISCUSSION

1. While much has been accomplished against the VC infrastructure, much more can be accomplished by closer integration, unified management and joint coordination of the many and varied programs in being. In addition, joint coordination and concerted action can generate substantial influence and pressure on the GVN at all levels to bring about a more productive and coordinated operation against the VC infrastructure.

2. To this end, on 18 June 1967, COMUSMACV approved a MACCORDS proposal for the coordination and management, through a joint civil-military management structure, of intelligence programs and attacks on the VC infrastructure and local irregular forces. This management structure will be headed by Deputy for CORDS to COMUSMACV, and will function through a series of coordinating committees and/or intelligence and operations coordinating centers ranging from national (Saigon) to district level, paralleling the US and GVN military command structures in South Vietnam.

GROUP-4  
DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS:  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

3. The proposed management elements for infrastructure Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX) will utilize existing command and technical channels.

4. The action program for mounting a stepped-up and more sharply focused attack on the VC infrastructure will be built largely on existing programs or resources, both US and GVN, already directed in whole or in part against the infrastructure target.

5. Facets of the anti-infrastructure program which will receive priority attention are:

a. Centralized evaluation of problems at all levels.

b. Continuous generation of centralized guidance, based on maximum current knowledge of the structure, strength and strategy of the VC infrastructure (and of the available forces and resources responsive to US/GVN control); common knowledge and understanding of VC organization and functioning.

c. Improved coordination of infrastructure intelligence collection and collation, more selective targeting and timely exploitation of operational intelligence, and more effective coordination of infrastructure intelligence and action operations with other military and civil programs and operations.

d. Realistic division of effort between the several echelons of operation, and vertical and lateral coordination of effort for efficiency and economy of effort.

e. Management reporting and information systems created and/or further exploited to support operations, and to surface and identify problem areas in the attack on the infrastructure and to make them responsive to management correction.

6. In addition to the general problems of management and coordination, two functional problem areas are: (a) the judicial treatment of VC civil defendants, and the creation and operation of an adequate Vietnamese detention program for members of the infrastructure; and (b) all aspects of the interrogation exploitation of infrastructure prisoners, whether

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

POWs or civil detainees and VC defectors, to include the proper functioning of systems in being and proper and prompt feedback of information from higher to lower echelons, and so on. Each of these problems requires centralized staff study with a view to coming up with specific action recommendations.

III. CONCLUSIONS

Certain services of common concern can only be carried out at the Saigon level, and a central staff mechanism is required to support the coordination of nationwide programs and operations. Moreover since the command structure of the RVN civil and military organizations and of the US advisory and command mechanisms in South Vietnam all converge at the Corps Tactical Zone level, it is necessary to establish at that level similar focal points and equivalent procedures for coordination of programs and operations. Nevertheless, the center of gravity of intelligence collection and synthesis concerning the infrastructure must be at province and the main weight of the attack on the infrastructure must be generated at both province and district.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

Approve the action program at TAB C.

L. WARD LATIMER  
ACofS, CORPS

TAB A - Program Status and Summary  
TAB B - Action Program

- 1 - Exc/Sec
- 2 - C&R
- 1 - ACoS, CORPS
- 1 - D/ICEX

MACJOIR-ICEX:RJParker:moc:21 Jul 67

- 1 - D/ICEX
- 1 - DD/ICEX
- 1 - C/RDC/P
- 1 - IB/SS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TAB A

ATTACK ON VC INFRASTRUCTURE  
PROGRAM STATUS AND SUMMARY

1. This program, under the title "Infrastructure Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation" (ICEX) was approved in concept by COMUSMACV on 18 June 1967.

2. The Saigon-level ICEX Committee, chaired by Deputy for CORPS to COMUSMACV, has held its initial meeting and established its basic operating policy for scheduling of future meetings and accomplishment of routine policy coordination. In addition to the Chairman, its members include: Special Assistant to the Ambassador; ACoIS, J-2 and ACoIS, J-3, MACV; and Chief, Revolutionary Development Division, CORPS.

3. The Special Assistant to the Ambassador has outlined to Brigadier General Loan, Director General of National Police, the proposed ICEX structure, and indicated to him that the U.S. side is urgently studying ways and means to better focus and coordinate the combined attack on the VC infrastructure.

4. A Saigon ICEX staff is being established and has begun to function on a skeletal basis, reporting directly to Deputy for CORPS to COMUSMACV, to support the ICEX Committee and conduct the day-to-day business of ICEX at the Saigon level. The Director and Deputy Director of this staff have been provided by OSA and MACV, respectively, as will be the remainder of its personnel. To supplement the capabilities of this staff, substantive assistance is being provided as required by OSA and MACV.

5. A MACV mission directive for Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation for Attack on VC Infrastructure has been coordinated among the concerned MACV staffs, and published, with an effective date of 9 July 1967.

6. The first of a series of OSA-sponsored conferences has been held to discuss the organization of the VC infrastructure, and the selection and operational attack on critical VC target personalities. Chief, Counterintelligence Division, MAC J-2, attended this meeting.

7. In summary, the basic organizational actions are underway, and fundamental operating procedures, and missions and functions statements are being developed to define relationships between the several levels of coordination, and to establish their respective responsibilities.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TAB B

ATTACK ON VC INFRASTRUCTURE ACTION PROGRAM

1. Promulgate MACV mission directive establishing the management mechanism for Infrastructure Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX); follow through with necessary, supplementary implementing instructions, directives and/or guidance. (Tab 1)
2. Brief Corps Senior Advisors and their deputies on the ICEX management concept and its relationship to the conduct of anti-infrastructure operations. (Tab 2)
3. Designate Corps ICEX Coordinators; convene Corps ICEX Committees and explain to appropriate US and RVNAF unit commanders and intelligence/counterintelligence advisors the ICEX concept and objectives. Select Province ICEX Coordinators. (Tab 3)
4. Concurrently, continue the development of existing District Operations and Intelligence Coordinating Centers (DOICC); begin to select additional districts in which DOICC's should be installed during the remainder of CY 1967. (Tab 4)
5. Complete organization and manning of the skeletal ICEX Staff; develop requisite missions and functions statements; prepare an initial SOP for the DOICC's based on experience to date, and initiate a continuing series of guidelines for various aspects of anti-infrastructure operations. (Tab 5)
6. Provide for necessary military personnel augmentation of ICEX coordinating elements at corps, province and district level. (Tab 6)
7. Brief the Director General of National Police in detail on the proposed concept for centralized management of a stepped-up attack on the VC infrastructure, and seek his endorsement and support of a corresponding GVN effort. Follow through with the briefing of other concerned GVN military, intelligence and security officials. (Tab 7)
8. Review infrastructure intelligence collection requirements, programs, reporting, collation and dissemination, and recommend necessary changes in the interest of greater efficiency, effective coordination and division of effort, improved target selection, and satisfaction of the several types of intelligence needs. (Tab 8)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

9. Review and make recommendations for more effective applications and coordination of existing programs and resources for exploitation of operational infrastructure intelligence for harassment, disruption, capture, exploitation and elimination or neutralization of the VC infrastructure. (Tab 9)
10. Conduct a comprehensive and definite study of all aspects of the problems of judicial handling and detention of VC civilian infrastructure. Recommend corrective actions, operating policies and procedures. (Tab 10)
11. Conduct an on-the-ground review of interrogation facilities, practices and procedures, including coordination, exploitation and follow-through, with a view to optimum support to the attack on VC infrastructure. (Tab 11)
12. Establish requisite reporting systems, both for purposes of program management and evaluation, and for support (including ADP) to field collection and collation activities and operations against the infrastructure. (Tab 12)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PROMULGATE ICEX MISSION DIRECTIVE

SITUATION

COMUSMACV and Ambassador Bunker approved on 16 June the proposed concept for mounting a stepped-up, coordinated attack on the VC infrastructure. As the first step toward implementing this new action program, a MACV directive, number 381-41, dated 9 July 1967, has been published and disseminated under the title: Military Intelligence - Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation for Attack on VC Infrastructure (C) Short Title: ICEX (V).

supplementary, implementing instructions, directives and/or guidances are required to clarify ICEX coordinating functions at corps, province and district level, to suggest certain organizational steps in establishing corps and province-level ICEX committees and related liaison arrangements.

ACTION

Draft supplementary guidances.

Responsibility: ICEX Staff

CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF CORPS SENIOR ADVISORS

SITUATION

As of 17 July 1967 when the MACV ICMX directive, number MS1-41, was distributed, the Corps Senior Advisors are in receipt of their first definitive notice of the general purpose, scope and concept of the action program for mounting the attack on VC infrastructure.

It is essential that this basic directive be supplemented by an oral briefing, of the Corps Senior Advisors, their deputies and principal intelligence and operation staff officers. This will provide an initial opportunity to clarify questions and to discuss problems of implementation and anticipated CVN response in each Corps area.

ACTION

Accomplish the requisite briefings prior to 31 July 1967, or as soon as possible thereafter.

Responsibility: ICMX Staff.

CONFIDENTIAL

DESIGNATE CORPS AND PROVINCE LEVEL ICEN COORDINATORS

SITUATION

Pursuant to MACV Directive Nr 381-41 (ICEN), each Corps Senior Advisor will designate his respective USA Regional Officer in Charge (ROIC) as his Corps ICEN Coordinator and principal staff officer on matters pertaining to mounting the attack on the VC infrastructure.

The Corps ICEN Coordinator, in turn, will convene and chair a Corps ICEN Committee, composed of the US Corps G-2, Senior Corps G-2 and G-3 Advisors, and the heads of principal US intelligence and counterintelligence units. He may find it appropriate also to form a working group to meet more frequently on ICEN matters, and to make still additional liaison arrangements to establish and maintain contact with the many US, FVMAF and GVN elements which will eventually become integrated into the attack on infrastructure.

Similarly, province-level ICEN Coordinators/principal ICEN staff officers must be designated from among qualified OSSA or MACV officers currently assigned to Province duties.

ACTION

- a. Designate Corps ICEN Coordinators, by 31 July 1967.

Responsibility: Corps Senior Advisors.

- b. Form Corps ICEN Committee and take other organization action as required.

Responsibility: Designated Corps ICEN Coordinators.

- c. Designate Province ICEN Coordinators/ICEN staff officers.

Responsibility: Senior Province Advisors, in consultation with Corps ICEN Coordinators, and subject to approval by Corps Senior Advisor (or his Deputy for COMUS).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTINUE AND EXPAND DEVELOPMENT OF DISTRICT OPERATIONS AND  
INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING CENTERS (DOICCS)

SITUATION

As of 19 July 1967, a total of 10 DOICC's are established and functioning, five in I Corps and five in III Corps. In addition, two districts in Dinh Thuan Province in II Corps have coordinating mechanisms established which have been functioning similar to the DOICC.

It is estimated that by the end of CY 1967 a total of 70 - 97 DOICCs will be established and functioning. The exact number will depend upon GVN approval and the local capacities of GVN elements to provide qualified personnel from existing programs and resources.

ACTION

Select Districts which meet criteria for establishment of DOICC's.

Responsibility: Corps ICEX Coordinator.

Activation, assuming GVN approval and support, is subject to approval by Senior Province Advisor, Corps Senior Advisor, and Saigon ICEX coordination with the supporting agencies concerned, in view of their program/budget responsibilities.

Tab 4

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ICEX STAFF ORGANIZATION AND INITIATION OF STAFF GUIDANCES AND INSTRUCTIONS

SITUATION

As of 20 July 1967, the status of the skeletal, Saigon ICEX Staff was as follows:

OSA personnel assigned: one full-time (Staff Director) and four part-time.

MACV personnel assigned: two full-time, and one part-time (Deputy Director, ICEX Staff).

An additional six MACV military personnel are being requested, and an additional four from OSA. Manning of this skeletal staff should be completed on or before 15 August 1967, when adequate office space is expected to become available.

To supplement the capabilities of this Staff, OSA has made available, to Director, ICEX Staff, the services of OSA officers and staff elements, totalling 15 additional personnel. These in turn may call upon other OSA specialists and staff elements for specific assistance. Similar, substantive support is or will be made available, as required by J-2 and other MACV elements.

It is not envisioned that the ICEX Staff will be expanded to the full 50 anticipated in the concept approved by COMUSMACV; however, additional specialists and secretarial/clerical personnel will be required.

ACTION

- a. Establish manpower requirements.

Responsibility: ICEX Staff.

- b. Provide personnel.

Responsibility: OSA, MACV.

Tab 5

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

MILITARY PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION FOR CORPS, PROVINCE AND DISTRICT  
ICBX COORDINATION ELEMENTS

SITUATION

The ICBX concept approved by COMUSMACV envisioned a total military personnel requirement of 126 officers and men to augment and assist designated coordinating officers at corps, province and district, as follows:

Corps

1 Intelligence (or CI) Officer	4	
1 Intelligence (or CI) Specialist	4	
1 Intelligence Clerk-typist	<u>4</u>	12

Province

1 Intelligence (or CI) Officer or Intelligence (or CI) Specialist NCO	44	44
--	----	----

District

1 Intelligence (or CI) Officer or Intelligence (or CI) Specialist NCO	70	<u>70*</u> 126
--	----	-------------------

\*It is estimated that 70 will need to be provided by MACV. Ten DOICC are manned by US military personnel provided by CSA from his resources. Up to 17 more may also be needed from resources currently available to the Corps Senior Advisor. Either officers (lieutenants) or qualified NCO's (E-6 or E-7) are acceptable for DOICC or province-level assignment. NCO's will be authorized to wear civilian clothes.

ACTION

- a. Submit ICBX field manpower augmentation requirements.

Responsibility: ICBX Staff, in consultation with Corps ICBX Coordinators.

- b. Provide requisite spaces and manpower.

Responsibility: MACV, and Corps Senior Advisors.

Tab 6

CONFIDENTIAL

Tab 6 (Continued)

Corps Senior Advisors will be requested to meet as many district level requirements as possible from current resources.

Corps and Province personnel are required as soon as possible, or by 15 September 1967, at the latest. Twenty (20) personnel will be required for districts during the period 15 August - 15 September. The remaining 30 can be phased over the period 15 September - 31 December 1967 at the rate of 15 - 20 a month.

Tab 3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

## BRIEFING AND COORDINATION WITH SENIOR GVN OFFICIALS

### SITUATION

The ICEX program cannot succeed without acceptance and energetic support by the Director General of National Police and other senior GVN military, intelligence and security officials, and the necessary policy direction from them to their subordinate echelons.

Brigadier General Nguyen Moc Loan, DGNP, has been briefed in general terms on the ICEX purpose and outline management structure.

### ACTION

a. Brief BG Loan, DGNP, in detail, on or about 7 August 1967, or as soon thereafter as possible.

Responsibility: Special Assistant to the Ambassador, with Director, ICEX Staff, and OSA liaison officer.

b. Assuming a favorable response from BG Loan, conduct further briefings with the concerned GVN intelligence, security and military officials.

Responsibility: ICEX Committee.

c. Prepare necessary talking papers, briefing materials and visual aids.

Responsibility: ICEX Staff, assisted by MACV and OSA.

d. Conduct follow-on briefings of GVN within Corps CTR.

Responsibility: Corps Senior Advisors and Senior Province Advisors, assisted by their ICEX coordinators and heads of US intelligence elements.

It is anticipated that the Saigon ICEX Staff will be required also to assist and to coordinate with the GVN in drafting the necessary GVN ICEX directives.

Tab 7

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REVIEW OF INFRASTRUCTURE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS  
AND PROGRAMS

SITUATION

The ICIX Staff has already begun a systematic inventory and review of US and GVN infrastructure collection requirements (such as MACV's "CORRAL", and OSA requirements), and activities, including the mission tasks and geographic distribution of resources in South Vietnam.

OSA supporting elements have begun to prepare or to develop requirements for briefings on the VC infrastructure, handbooks, interrogation guides and related material.

These and related actions are essential to training, orientation, and redirection of US and GVN personnel and components having responsibilities for intelligence collection and collation, and operational attack against the VC infrastructure.

ACTION

- a. Review infrastructure intelligence collection.

Responsibility: Coordination -- ICIX Staff; as a command and technical guidance function -- a continuing responsibility of the departments, agencies and components concerned.

- b. Similar reviews and planning actions must be undertaken also at Corps and Province level, and the attack on infrastructure incorporated into or coordinated with Province Pacification Plans.

Responsibility: Senior Corps and Province Advisors, with their ICIX staff officers.

CONFIDENTIAL

REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION PROGRAMS TO EXPLOIT  
INFRASTRUCTURE INTELLIGENCE

SITUATION

Specific actions have already been initiated to focus and concentrate existing assets and resources more precisely on the VC infrastructure target. These include redirection of the National Police Field Force against infrastructure, as its major function. In addition, the PRU will be concentrated even more fully on anti-VC operations, and their training, direction, coordination and control reinforced by the assignment of over 40 military personnel to augment their present civilian advisor/program officers.

Further studies and operational guidelines are planned to encompass such subjects as DCICC operation; psychological and propaganda operations against the VC infrastructure; increased exploitation of Chieu Hoi and Hoi Chanh for anti-infrastructure operations, intelligence collection and interrogations, improved coordination of military/police joint or combined sweep and destroy or cordon and search operations; anti-infrastructure operations and population and resource control; and the special problems of maritime and riverine operations.

ACTION

Review, and present recommendations for reorientation, redirection or closer focus of action programs and action resources against the infrastructure target.

Responsibility: ICEX Committee, assisted by ICEX Staff and Corps ICEX staff officers. This is a continuing requirement.

CONFIDENTIAL

## IMPROVE CIVILIAN DETENTION SYSTEMS

### SITUATION

A problem which has already reached critical proportions in Vietnam concerns the growing burden of handling large numbers of civilian detainees, swept up in military operations, and also those arrested in more normal fashion.

First and foremost is the total inadequacy of physical facilities in being for either processing, holding or imprisoning civil detainees. Such prisons or prisoner compounds as exist are enormously overcrowded, and all categories and varieties of suspects, persons awaiting trial, those already tried and convicted, and so on, are crowded indiscriminately in these existing facilities. The first requirement is adequate physical camps, permitting proper segregation of and proper controls over the various categories of individuals.

Another serious aspect of the same problem is the question of screening the civil detainees, so as to permit the rapid sorting out of those VC who should be processed from an interrogation standpoint and those who should be processed judicially for long-term imprisonment. Equally important here is the rapid identification of innocent civilians, so that they can be released (after proper registration and record making), either to go back to their villages or to relocate as refugees. As refugees, there must be arrangements made, physical facilities and material provided, and so on.

Those who are detained for further processing and prosecution then are thrown at the mercies of a totally inadequate and cumbersome judicial system, with the result that they must wait for as long as a year before their cases are reviewed and determination made. In the meantime they are living under sub-standard conditions with no useful occupation, and numbers apparently escape or manage to buy their way out. Both controls and records are lacking, so that no one really knows how many such people there are, who they are, nor what happens to them.

One result of the inadequacies of the system is that, in a number of instances, detainees are released almost immediately, even if substantial bodies of evidence may exist against him: the Province authorities can neither imprison them nor feed them.

These problems -- construction of screening and detention facilities, judicial reform and streamlining, greatly increasing the speed or rate of handling, coordination with refugee activities

Tab 10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Tab 10 (Continued)

creating a meaningful and accurate registration and records system, and so on -- are closely related to the elimination of infrastructure. It does little good to acquire large bodies of intelligence information, conduct operations throughout the country, both military and civil, capture or arrest all kinds of VC, only to put them into a system which permits them to be released, to escape, or to buy their way out and go back into operation.

There is desperate and highest priority need, therefore, for the creation of adequate screening detention, registration and judicial facilities and systems. There is need first of all for the immediate creation of detention/screening facilities for civil defendants, similar to POW facilities. There is, moreover, need for administrative legislative action by the GVN to facilitate rapid judicial disposal of the thousands of pending cases. And finally, there is need, in conjunction with detention, registration and judicial processes, for devising a system to keep track of these subjects, know what their disposition was, and know where they are and what they are doing, either inside or outside the prison system.

ACTION

In collaboration with MACV and USAID staff elements, and with a legal consultant provided by OSA to head the study team, an urgent study must be conducted of the full scope of the VC civilian detainee problem, with a view to specific recommendations concerning ICMX system, policies and SOP's, construction of screening and detention facilities; establishment of screening and interrogation criteria and procedures, legal processes and controls; coordination with refugee and Chieu Hoi programs; long-term holding and rehabilitation facilities and projects; and registration, records and follow-up processes, including probation procedures.

Preliminary action should be initiated by 22 July 1967, and an intensive study completed not later than 20 August.

Consultation and collaboration with GVN officials should begin at the earliest possible stage, and arrangements made to ensure access to necessary records, facilities, installations, organization, and related support.

Responsibility: ICMX Staff, directly assisted by OSA, MACV and USAID.

Tab 10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Tab 10 (Continued)

Follow-on staff action will be required, coordinated by ICEN Staff, but with actual program and project development and implementation made the responsibility of the concerned US (and GVN) agencies.

Tab 10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REVIEW INTERROGATION PRACTICES AND EXPLOITATION

SITUATION

VC suspects and prisoners are being captured or arrested by military units, by the National Police, by Province Reconnaissance Units, and by the Military Security Service. Other knowledgeable VC personalities become available for intelligence exploitation through the Chien Hoi program. At present the coordination and management of their exploitation, to acquire the maximum intelligence on the VC infrastructure and irregular force target and to ensure that significant personalities do not resist interrogation successfully or escape identification, is inadequate.

A study must be made, leading to recommendations for actions which will serve to:

- a. Identify rapidly significant sources wherever they enter the system.
- b. Ensure that local interrogation operations at province/sector level are adequately focussed on and adequately supported with intelligence inputs from all components concerning the infrastructure target.
- c. Ensure that adequate interrogation/detention facilities are established and maintained with full support from all components involved.
- d. Facilitate the prompt identification and transfer of selected sources to the interrogation facility best equipped to exploit their knowledge fully.
- e. Resolve questions of priorities in the interrogation process.
- f. Ensure that a central record is maintained on a continuing basis of particularly knowledgeable and cooperative sources who should be readily recoverable for reinterrogation.

ACTION

Study and review of interrogation systems, procedures, facilities and controls.

Responsibility: ICEN staff, with direct assistance of MAAG, GSA and CORDS/PSD. Initial study should be completed by mid-November 1967. Follow-through actions will be required on a continuing basis with GVN counterparts.

Tab 11

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ESTABLISH REPORTING SYSTEMS

SITUATION

Implicit in any program coordinating and management system is a reporting system which will provide the means to measure progress, evaluate performance, identify problem areas and undertake corrective action. Exploiting existing command, technical and reporting systems wherever practicable, or revising or supplementing them to meet ICEX needs as well, such a system must be established to support each level of ICEX management, subject to centralized management coordination from Saigon.

Similarly, existing program evaluations systems for other pacification programs must be examined to see if they are adaptable to ICEX needs.

The ADP system established by MACV J-2 at CICY for compiling personality information on VC target personalities is a particularly important common source of support for Corps, Sector (Province) and District intelligence and exploitation operations. The present system provides for development of the data base by the preparation of input sheets on the basis of interrogation reports, captured documents, agent reports and finished or semi-finished intelligence collations, received from Sector S-2s, CDRC, CMIC, NIC. Through Combined Intelligence Staff the Provincial Interrogation Center interrogation reports and Police Special Branch provincial compilations of infrastructure organization and staffing are being provided; Special Branch and CIO (SOC) spot reporting can also be made available. In addition to the input generated by the political OB section of CICY itself, an additional input is at present being received from the Combined Intelligence Staff (CT-4), located at HQS Directorate General of National Police in Saigon. This staff has assumed direct responsibility for inputting into the ADP system all data concerning VC personalities in the city of Saigon, the province of Gia Dinh, Di An District of Bien Hoa Province, Cu Chi District of Hau Nghia Province, and other VC organizational elements comprising the organization of VC Military Region 4. A study should be made of the ADP operation as it is at present constituted and of the capability of the ADP system to produce collated printouts for use by all Corps, Sector (Province) and District coordinators on a regular basis.

On the basis of the experience accumulated in the CT-4 coordination operation, a determination should also be made concerning the feasibility of decentralizing certain input operations to the collation sections of selected Police Special Branch Provincial Interrogation Centers, to provide for the collection and

Tab 12

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Tab 12 (Continued)

inputting of data from all intelligence collecting elements at province level. This proposal is based on the assumption that other GVN agencies can be induced to assign personnel to work with the PIC collation staffs in this field.

The feasibility of producing printouts which can be used by Vietnamese intelligence personnel at province and district level who have no command of English should also be explored.

A determination should be made concerning the exclusion of certain marginal categories of VC personalities from the ADP operation. In this regard, suitable criteria for selectivity in the production of printouts should also be established.

For the immediate/future, however, while additional experience is being gained in CT-4, first priority must be given to the development of the most basic and fundamental collation, analysis and recording-keeping capabilities, using simple manual systems, in GVN DOICC's, PIC's and other infrastructure intelligence coordinating centers.

ACTION

Development of a coordinated reporting system.

Responsibility: ICEX Staff, assisted by MACV and CSA, and in collaboration with Corps ICEX Coordinators. An initial system, subject to further refinements, must be in operation by 15 August 1967.

Tab 12

CONFIDENTIAL